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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the discussion of the Napoleonic 
Legend and its effect on the European policy of the Emperor Napoleon 
III~ The object is to determine to what extent Napoleon III used the 
Legend as a guide for his European policy in three major developmentsi 
the Crimean War, the unification of Italy and the creation of a united 
Germany. The success of the policy is also to be determined from the 
evidence presented. 
The author wishes to express her appreciation to her major adviser, 
Dr. Douglas Hale, for his guidance, assistance ,and patience throughout 
this study. Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. Neil Hackett and 
Dr. Edward Walters for their encouragement and help in the final 
preparation of the manuscript. 
A note of thanks is given to my father, Col, Herbert w. Krueger, 
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CHAPTER I 
THE NAPOLEONIC LEGEND 
The year was 1815, the setting was the grand halls of the Tuileries. 
Many people rushed about preparing for the last desperate gamble. 
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, stood unconcerned in the middle of 
all the bustle discussing quietly with his marshals the impending attack 
against the Allied forces in Belgium when a small seven-year-old boy ran 
in tears into the room to the Emperor. "Sire, my governess tells me you 
are going to the war. Oh, do not go! Do not go! They want to kill 
you. 11 Napoleon, touched by his nephew's concern, patted the child on 
his head and remarked to Marshal Soult, 11The boy has a good heart and 
1 noble soul; who knows but he may be the hope of my race. 11 
Thirty-seven years later that same boy, now grown to manhood, was 
hunting on the grounds of St. Cloud where, like his uncle before him, 
he was informed of the wishes of the French nation. Through a plebi-
scite the people had voiced their approval of the change of government 
which renewed the hereditary, dynastic Empire. The date was December 2, 
1852, the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz and the coronation of 
Napoleon I. ~ouis Napoleon Bonaparte, heir of the first Napoleon, had 
achieved what politicians of that day thought impossible=-the return of 
a Bonaparte to the throne of France. The Napoleonic Legend had served 
its purpose. 
2 
But what was this legend, this ideal that had accomplished the 
impossible? Who had contributed to it to make it the dominating force 
that allowed a relatively unknown nephew<-M-Of,the Erri.pE!ror to capture the 
hearts of France with.his name?. Why were the French people so receptive 
to the name Napoleon, a name which had once meant war, dictatorship, 
and tyranny? The object of this work is to define the Napoleonic 
Legend, as seen by Napoleon III, and to ascertain to what degree it 
influenced his dealings with Europe in three major developments of his 
age--the Crimean War, the unification of Italy, and the consolidation 
of Germany into a united nation state. 
It is evident that Napoleon Bonaparte dominated and molded not 
only the Europe of his post-Revolutionary era, but his memory contrib-
uted greatly to the character of Europe of the entire nineteenth 
century as well. This domination resulted from the formation and per-
petuation of the Napoleonic Legend, which Louis Napoleon accepted and 
believed as his own. Using the Legend as his lodestar, Louis shaped 
his actions to the dictates of the Ideal, which in turn shaped 
Continental Europe for twenty years. The legend had been created by 
Napoleon himself in exile on St. Helena where he was sent after his 
defeat at Waterloo. The exile symbolized the nadir of the Napoleonic 
destiny. The Congress of Vienna, ignoring the forces of nationalism 
and liberalism which began to stir the Continent, reshaped Europe along 
pre-Revolutionary lines, established a congress system pledged to keep 
peace and the status quo in Europe, and filled the void left by the 
destruction of Napoleon's Continental domination with reaction and 
conservatism. France, lover of.!!, Glorie, was humiliated; her bounda-
ries were diminished, the ineffectual Bourbons were recalled, and she 
3 
was isolated and watched suspiciously. The Four Powers sent Napoleon 
to the island in the Atlantic, St. Helena. By deporting Napoleon to 
that islet and denying him the title of Emperor, the men of the Holy 
Alliance, the champions of reaction, martyred the Emperor and created a 
new symbol o.f peace, order and liberty. The men of 1815 rendered a 
tremendous service to the memory of Napoleon by rescuing it from the 
2 commonplace. The island provided an effective background for the 
closing scenes of his life; the solitary rock whose narrow confines 
conquered the devouring ambition which had tried to make Europe its 
3 dominion. In that scene of confinement, Napoleon concentrated, 
deepened, refined, humanized, and perfected himself; his real corona-
4 tion, he said, was suffering. He created the picture of himself as the 
new Prometheus, chatned to a rock in punishment for attempting to better 
mankind by spreading the ideals of the French Revolution. 
During one of the tedious days aboard the ship taking Napoleon and 
his companions to their exile, the Emperor asked one of his aides, 
Count Emmanuel de Las Cases, 11 , •• but what can we do in that desolate 
place?'' ''Sire, 11 he replied, 11we will live on the past.,.•'' ''Be it so, 
we will write our Memoirs, After all, a man ought to fulfill his 
destinies; this is my grand docttinea 5 let mine also be accomplished." 
In his greater days of glory he had been too busy being Napoleonic to 
find time to be a Bonapartist. 6 But after 1815 the Emperor set forth 
on his last and perhaps greatest achievement--the Napoleonic Legend. 
Once at St. Helena, Napoleon possessed a rare opportunity to 
present himself in a favorable light to the peoples of France and 
Europe. He was quite aware of this, as he remarkeda 
Our situation here may even have its attractions, the 
universe is looking at us, we remain the martyrs of an 
innnortal cause. Millions of men weep for us, and glory is 
in mourning. Adversity was wanting to my career. If I had 
died on the throne amidst the clouds of my omnipotence, I 
should have remained a problem to many men. Today7 thanks 
to my misfortune, they can judge me naked as I am. 
He was the first to provide a portrait of himself in unblemished 
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beauty, endearing h1.nnanity, greatness and virtue. He became a pretender 
to his own throne and in the position of greater freedom and less re-
sponsibility, he began redrafting and revising his own life and created 
his own memory. On this island he had the time to become a doctrinaire 
and the first Bonapartist. On those lone, hot afternoons and during 
those interminable nights, he dictated to his faithful aides the sub-
stance of the myth which laid the foundation of the Second Empire. 
From the start Napoleon was determined to exploit his grievances 
and make himself into a martyr: "l have worn the imperial crown p:fl 
Franch, the Iron Crown of Italy. England has now given me a greater 
and more glorious crown than either of them--for it is that worn by the 
8 Saviour of the World--a crown of thorns." He was quite conscious of 
the advantage that this memory and cause would derive from his impjis-
omnent. He planned to excite compassion, pity and enthusiasm by the 
tale of his sufferings at the hands of a brutal govermnent and inh1.nnan 
jailor. If he could no longer rule the people directly, he would rule 
them indirectly through his memory. 
Surrounding himself with willing diarists, Napileon created his 
own legend in the "Campaign of St. Helena." The Emperor encouraged his 
companions in exile to write down his words in their journals. 
11Y~sterday evening," wrote General Gaspard Gourgard,· 11the Emperor told 
9 me that I might turn my leisure to profit in writing down his sayings." 
Marshal Henri-Gratien Bertrand and Louis Saint Denis did not intend to 
publish their journals, but the others, Las Cases, Charles Montholon, 
and Dr. Barry oiMeara, did.lo From these diaries Napoleon can be seen 
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deliberately impressing the world with what he wanted the people to 
believe. Most. impressively from Count Las C,;1ses' lengthy five volumes 
does the Emperor appear; Napoleon, the friend of the people, the 
savior of the Revolution, the supporter of the principles of liberalism 
and nationalism. Through the pens of these men a selective Napoleon 
came into existence. They purged his memory of all recollections of 
his iron will, of his authority, of his insatiable demands for sacri-
fices of French blood and French resources, and of the two invasions of 
French territory that his ambition had brought about. As a champion of 
democracy and the people, he had tried to organize a free France to 
assume thsa leadership of an united Europe. In the perspective of his 
diarists, his fall appeared as the defeat of the Rights of Man and 
liberty. 
Napoleon designed the new doctrine to compete with the Peace of 
Vienna and all the ideas for which the Congress stood. If therefore 
became necessary to include a strong mixture of liberal ideas in the 
Napoleonic philosophy. The Emperor's heir had to be prepared to offer 
democracy to the people of France and nationalism to the people of 
Europe. Napoleonts duty in exile lay in demonstrating that these prin-
ciples had been the policy of his house. He hastily refashioned his 
career to emphasize the new creeds of the day. 
The doctrine of Bonapartism was designed to contradict every prin-
ciple which the treaties of 1815 had been based upon. The French 
Revolution had been repudiated by the men at Vienna; therefore, 
Napoleon embraced the principles of 1789. The recalled Bourbons had 
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repainted the lilies on the French flag; Bonapartism had to hoist the 
tricolor. Napoleon portrayed himself as the child of the Revolution 
who had crushed the old dynasties and envisioned himself as the repre-
sentative of the Rights of Man, liberty, equality, fraternity, and 
universal suffrage. 
He felt obliged to identify with the Revolution because it was 
only through it that his dynasty could justifiably return to power. 
The gains won must be preserved. Napoleon claimed that the only safe 
solution t"o the excesses of 1789 lay in a popular monarchy, and he 
believed that his dynasty could provide the only successful form of 
government for France since it, and it alone, had the complete backing 
of the people. In retrospect, he boasted, 11 ! closed the gulf of anarchy 
and cleared the chaos. I purified the Revolution, dignified Nations 
and established Kings. I excited every kind of emulation, rewarded 
11 every kind of merit and extended the limits of gloryt 11 
At St. Helena he became the executor of the Revolution who had 
tamed and organized its wild forces to bring unity and security to 
France. Most importantly, he supervised the spreading of its ideals, 
12 which acted as a civilizing agent throughout all Europe. Napoleon 
claimed to have preserved the moral influences of the Revolution while 
diminishing the fear it inspired when he said; 
I retained all the Revolutionary interest because I 
had no need to destroy them. This was one of the sources 
of my strength, and it also explains why I was able to 
set aside the Revolutio.nal'y:'.theories. Everyone knew that 
the Emperor did not and could not wish for a counter 
revolution •••• ! had preserved the Revolutionary interests 
while banishing the Revolutionary theories.13 
The ideal of Napoleon as a man of the people and of equality went 
hand in hand with Napoleon as the Savior of the Revolution. One of the 
7 
three great slogans of 1789 was equality, ·and Napoleon made it clear to 
the world that in his system every man had equal opportunity regardless 
of birth, age or creed. He had rewarded merit and service, and he 
claimed~ "Wherever I found talent and courage, I rewarded it~ My 
principle was the career open to talent, without asking whether there 
14 were any quarters of nobility to show. 11 
Napoleon emphasized the fact that his power came from the will of 
the people expressed th~·ough the use of the plebiscite, He justified 
his autocracy on the grounds that France had to be governed by a· firm 
hand and will, but assented that the will had to be drawn from the 
streng~hof public opinion. 15 The state which Napoleon had founded was 
based on the despotic power whi.ch was. necessary to his own purposes and 
the.needs of France. It substituted a regular, well organized adminis-
tration for anarchy and based itself on the principle before the law, 
rewarded merit apd governed in the interests of France. He boasted 
that, "Every Frenchman could say under my reign;. 1 1 shall be a minister, 
a marshal of Fran~e, a grand officer ot the Empire, duke, count, baron, 
if I deserve ita even king. rn 16 He was, he said, the champion of the 
common man: 
I am the Emperor·of the peasants, of the lower ranks 
in France •••• Thus, in spite of all that you see, the 
people return to me--there is a sympathy between us., •• 
The popular fibre responds to mine: I am come from the 
ranks of the people, my voice has influence over them ••• 
because between them and me there is an identity of 
nature •••• ! am the man of the people, if the people 
sincerely wish for liberty; I owe it to them. I have 
recognized their sovereignty, I am bound to lend an ear 
to their designs., •• 17 
Napoleon claimed that he came from t.he people, and the people had 
placed the imperial crown on his head. His memory would be revered by 
them. 
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Attuning himself to the political current since 1815, Napoleon, in 
the process of refashioning his career to fit the interests of his 
dynasty and his own historical reputation, became the standardbearer of 
liberalism and nationalism. The Powers which overthrew him had become 
the arch-enemies of these dynamic new forces, and it was not hard for 
Napoleon to portray himself as their champion. His reign, he pointed 
out, had been based on equality and liberty exemplified in the liberal 
constitution of Benjamin Constant and the Hundred Days. Napoleon 
excused his autocracy as only a temporary measure~ 11If I had won in 
1812, my constitutional reign would have begun." In discussing this 
with Las Cases, he stated, 
Liberal ideas flourish in Great Britain, they 
enlighten America, and they are nationalized in France.a•• 
Liberal opinion will rule the universe •••• This memorable 
era will be inseparately connected with my name, for, 
after all, it cannot be denied that I kindled the torch 
and consecrated the principles; and now persecution 
renders me quite their Messiah. Thus even when I shall 
be no more, I shall still continue to be the leading 
star of the nations •••• 18 
In governing the conquered territories of Europe, Napoleon had 
instituted the French law codes and the gains won in the Revolution; 
liberalism was thereby spread into the satellite kingdoms of the 
Grand Empire. 
Napoleon was also portrayed as a practicing nationalist. The 
settlement of Vienna ignored every tenet of the doctt,ine of nationalism; 
if the European opposition to the peace treaties were to be mobilized 
for Bonapartism, Napoleon must be shown favoring and aiding the 
fashionable doctrine. His nationalism, which before Waterloo had been 
frankly opportunistic, became dogmatic at St. Helena. Napoleon claimed 
that he and his troops extended the intense brand of French nationalism 
to. the oppressed peoples of Europe. He saw himself as the prophet of 
this new religion, and he hoped that the peoples of Europe would look 
nostalgically back to the time when he governed their lands. 111 wish 
to make of each of these peoples a single nations," he said. 19 
9 
If Napoleon'was to pose successfully as the prophet of nationalism, 
there had to be concrete examples showing how he had furthered his new 
cause. The easiest proof for his claim was Italy; Napoleon had said 
that he had always predicted Italian unity. He explained his successive 
annexation of the different parts of the peninsula as a manifestation 
of his desire to supervise and advance the national education of the 
people. For the first time in centuries the peninsula had been governed 
by a single plan. From the Alps to the island of Sicily, Italian 
lawyers had administered the Napoleonic code, feudal limitations had 
been abolished and young Italians had known the benefits of the French 
Revolution. The name Italy was restored to the peninsula, memories of 
20 Italian glory were awakened, and the Risorgimento was begun. 
In one conversation with Marshal Bertrand about his desire for 
Italian unity, Napoleon stated that 11All France, ••• would also be willing 
to make war so as to ensure'the independence of Italy, because that 
21 would redound to their personal credit. 11 He claimed that his name 
would always be popular in Italy; the Italians would look back on the 
period of Napoleonic rule as a lost opportunity for their liberation. 
For, Las Cases explained; 
It was Napoleon's desire to create anew the Italian 
Nation, and to re-unite the Venetians, Milanese, 
Piedmontese, Genoese, Tuscans, Parmesans, Modenese, 
Romans, Neopolitans, Sicilians, and Sardinians, in one 
independent nation., •• : such. was the immortal trophy 
he was raising to his glory!22 
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As another example of his na,tionalist sentiment, the Emperor 
invoked the name of Germany. Owing to the political complexity of its 
many kingdoms, duchies, and free cities, the Emperor admitted that the 
task of unification would require far more time than in the case of 
Italy. He claimed to have merely simplified the monstrous complexity 
of German political geography by reducing the number of states from 
250 to 31 in his Confederation of the Rhine. 
Absurd as it may seem, Napoleon on St. Helena also passed as the 
champion of peace. He explained that peace was necessary for.the 
regeneration of Europe. He had always wished for peace, but the 
dynasties of the ancien regime, particularly England, would not allow 
it. The aim of the Napoleonic foreign policy, as N~poleon described it, 
had been the reorganization of the Continent along liberal lines--a 
European confederation. He claimed that he had only wanted the natural 
boundaries, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, for France. He 
wished to secure independence for his country and the establishment of 
a solid European peace. Napoleon was not the aggressor, but he had 
been obliged to repel the coalitions of Europe which never ceased to 
23 make war upon France, her principles, and her Emperor. 
In dbcussing his plan for the Continent he stated, 111 intended to 
organize a great federative European system which I had conce;ved as 
conformable to the spi·rit of the age and favorable to the progress of 
24 civilization." He explained that his policy had consisted of 
establishing a European association by basing it on satisfied national-
ities and general interests. A common European code and courts would 
have been created as well as a uniform system for money, weights and 
11 
measures. The EmperoT also claimed patrimony for the idea of the Holy 
Alliance--an alliance of nations through their kings for, rather than 
25 against, the people. 
These were the ideas which were reshaped and refined to fit the 
new image of the Emperor. The harsh features of his rule were 
suppressed. Napoleon was to be remembered as the so].dier of the 
Revolution, a misunderstood idealist whose.plans for a liberal France 
and a new Europe were broken by a cruel destiny. They were meant to 
attract all of the dissatisfied people of Europe to the banner of 
Bonapart ism. 
During the years Napoleon created his Legend, Europe enjoyed a 
well-earned rest after twenty years of cataclysmic upheavals. Tl).ings 
returned to normalc soldiers became civilians again; farmers plowed 
under the battlefields. France remained Napoleonic without knowing it: 
the Bourbons swore allegiance to the existing laws, the Napoleonic 
Code; the government retained the same administrative system. 
France was torn during the years of the Restoration between the 
absolutists and the democrats, Catholics and the atheists, emigres and 
men who had heartily supported the ideals of 1789. The t'hreat of a 
White Terror aroused the peasants who feared the loss. of a clerical and 
noble lands which they had acquired during the Revolution. The Bourbons 
added to this terror by searching for all known and suspected ardent 
supporters of Napoleon. The government greatly reduced the army, and 
many of the Napoleonic officers were put on half pay. These disgruntled 
soldierg were soon scattered all over France, spreading their hatred 
against the Bourbons. Despite these problems, the people settled down 
after the excitement.and wars of the Napoleonic Era. But their 
children, born between campaigns and nurtured on the glory of the 
Empire, reached adulthood in the 1820s during the lackluster Restora-
tion. As writer Alfred de Musset described it: 
D~ring the wars of the Empire, while husbands and 
brothers were away in G~rmany, anxious mothers gave birth 
to a hectic, sickly, nervous generation. Conceived 
between two battles, schooled with the sounds of rolling 
drums in their ears, boys in their thouijands eyed on 
another gloomily, as ·they tried over their frail muscles. 
At intervals their fathers appeared from the bloodshed, 
held them to the gold braid on their breast's, set them 
down, and took to horse again.26 
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As the children of 1810 grew to be the adults of 1825, they remembered 
the glory of their fathers. Romanticism and liberalism were the 
sentiments of their age, and many of t~e young men embraced these ideas. 
Their politics were lightly brushed by romance as they regarded the 
Empire with favor. '.L'll.ey looked upon Napoleon's plight with sorrow that 
such a great man as he, who had worked for the betterment of mankind, 
could meet such a tragic fate. But at this point the effect was merely 
sentimental; it was not yet a political force. 
After 1815 the kings began to feel safe again and attempted to 
return to the pre-Revolutionary era by ignoring their peoples• national-
liberal ideals. In their disappointment, the people began to wonder if 
they had picked the wrong side in the late struggle. '.L'll.ey gave Napoleon 
all of the credit for the work of the Revolution. By the mid·l~20s 
' liberalism had assumed a Napoleonic tinge. The romantic movement 
underlied the growth of liberalism and nationalism, and in the course 
of the 1820s it became increasingly evident that romanticism was 
. 27 
beginning to rally to liberalism. 
The Legend took hold most securely among the peasants. These men 
found the idealized civilian life a little dull after their return. 
13 
Their thoughts began to dwell on the days of their youth when they, the 
devoted soldiers, followed the Little Corporal to the end of the world. 
These veterans became the heralds of the Legend. The peasantry, next 
to the army, had alway:; been Hapoleon's main support; they saw him as 
their bulwa_rk against feudalism and jealously guarded his fame and 
glory. The Emperor was "The Marr'' of popular imagination. His heroic 
exploits were retold again and again around the hearths of F~ance as 
old campaigners relived their youth while passing down his supernatural 
achievements to a generation who knew him only second hand. It 
gathered force from the flood of memoirs, which came from Napoleon's 
circle at St. Helena. 
The Legend, which played such an unusual role in the post-
Napoleonic era, had three main sources: imagination, which at the same 
time exaggerated his exploits and motives and simplified his vices; 
propaganda, Napoleon's bulletins and memoirs and the journals of his 
· 28 
companions in exile; and, liter~ture. 
The young writers and poets of that romantic age could not help 
but be influenced by the dynamic figure of the transformed Napoleon. 
The appeal cf the lonely figure on a rock in the middle of a hostile 
sea took firm hold of their imaginations. The reactionary spirit of the 
Restoration contributed to the creation of Napoleon as the bourgeois 
hero, and the people, led by the writers of the day, flocked to his 
cause. After his death in 1821, literary men like Pierre-Jean Beranger, 
and towards 1830 Victor Hugo and Alfred dd Musset, began to praise 
Napoleon. B~ranger, lover of liberty and hater of the priests and 
nobles, idealized the Emperor and made Napoleonism of the masses more 
universal and profound. He created, to some extent, the memories he 
14 
claimed to transcribe, but the people read the apocryphal accounts and 
believed in them. His simple verses, like "The Recollections of the 
People" and "St. Helena", both recorded and stimulated the tradition of 
Bonapartism in the countryside and enlisted the peasants, who felt most 
cruelly the return of the gentry under the Bourbons, to the ranks of 
N 1 . 29 apo eonism. The Emperor became the symbol of the freedom and brave 
endeavors of the past; the strange alliance between Napoleon and the 
liberal cause /~hich he had attempted to erect became a reality. 
Victor Hugo, another contributor to the movement, found in the 
Emperor a figure worthy of his romantic longings for greatness. In the 
novel~ Countr~ Doctor, ~alzac had a veteran of Napoleon's campaigns 
seated in .front of a fire talking about the supernatural adventures of 
30 the Little Corporal. 
While in France Bonapal;'tism came to be mingled vaguely with 
republicanism, patriotism and romanticism, the rule of Napoleon abroad 
had been regarded as revolutionary~ The Bonapartist enthusiasm lay in 
the liberals• remembrance of him as the enemy of the hated ideals of 
the Holy Alliance. 
In other parts of Europe dissatisfied liberals, nationalists and 
romantics heard the new doctrine and believed in it. Even in England, 
the cult of Napoleon was a powerful force. As early as 1814 Byron had 
likened the Emperor to Prometheus, 
O, like the thief of fire from heaven, 
Wilt then with-stand.the shock? 
And share with him, the unforgiven, 
His vulture and his rock.31 
After the fall of Napoleon, Byron lamented the collapse of his great~ 
ness in his Childe Harold'~ Pilgrimage (1816), and attributed it to 
the pettiness of lesser men. 32 
15 
In Germany too, when they saw that the defeat of Napoleon did not 
bring on an era of freedom and peace but one of a confining police 
state, the writers looked to Napoleon as the symbol of their lost 
liberty. Heinrich Heine, who was a boy had seen the Emperor, was 
profoundly affected by Napoleonism. As a few, he felt greatly the loss 
of the French law codes in Germany at the end of the Empire. He 
t d N 1 'th lib li d ti li i hi 'ti 33 equa e apo eon w1 era sm an na ona sm n s wri. ngs. 
For those who did not read, the Legend of the Emperor slowly and 
surely laid hold on their lives through pictures. The staid, stiff 
portraits of the Empire changed to moving and dashing pictures of 
·battlefields, marches and symbolic portraitures of Napoleon on his 
lonely rock. His image was seen on cheap lithographs and imperial bric-
a-brae, on plates, bottles and handkerchiefs, Napoleon, Emperor of the 
French, st~pped out of his formal surroundings and came to life as the 
savior, guardian and hope of his country. 
Under the July Monarchy of Louis Philippe, 1830-1848, the Legend 
rose to a crescendo. Writers and historians wrote prolifically on the 
topic; Napoleonic illustrations covered the bookshop windows. The 
bourgeois reign of the Orleanists was very dullf To satisfy F4ance 1s 
need for glory, the government officially fostered the cult of the dead 
Emperor. Louis Philippe became the chief agent of the Empire in an 
attempt to arouse enthµsiasm for his own reign; he hoped to integrate 
the Empire into the mainstream of the Restoration. The government 
restored the Vendome Column; the Arc de Triomphe was completed and 
dedicated to the Little Corporal; Versailles became a museum of 
Imperial battle pictures. The most dramatic gesture was the fulfillment 
of Napoleon's willr the return of his body to the banks of the Seine 
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to lie in the midst of the French people. It was a spectacular event 
in the late summer of 1840. The caisson bearing the body of the 
Emperor passed thousands of cheering people on its way to the Invalides. 
As it passed cries of 11~ l'Empereur!" 11~ Napoleon!". filled the 
air. But. at this time it required an effort to be Napoleonic without 
a Bonaparte. 
As the crowd cheered for the dead Emperor, another Bonaparte, 
eavesdropping, heard the enthusiasm of the people and dreamed. This 
other Bonaparte was Louis Napoleon awaiting trial for an attempted coup 
against the government at Boulogne. Louis Napoleon was in his heart 
34 the heir to the fictitious Napoleon created by the St. Helena Legend. 
He hoped to avenge his uncle and return a Bonaparte to power in France. 
Louis Napoleon, son of Louis and Hortense Bonaparte, entered into 
the world in 1808 when the first Empire was at its zenith. His father 
was a younger brother of the Emperor and his mother was the Empress 
Josephine's daughter, so the young prince was intimately related to the 
fortunes of the Empire. When Marie Louise, Napoleon's second wife, 
deserted him after his defeat in 1814, Hortense and her sons became the 
Emperor's most intimate family. The memory of this time remained with 
Louis throughout his life. Louis learned the Napoleonic religion from 
his mother; he never doubted the Legend, and it was from the myth that 
he took the eighteenth-century idea that liberty was born from order, 
which became the foundation of his Ceasarian democracy. 
The death iri 1832 of the Emperor's son, Napoleon II, placed in the 
front ranks a Bonapartist prince who had faith in the Bonapartist 
principles; he alone 6f his remaining family considered his heritage a 
17 
responsibility rather.than a privilege. Even before 1832, Louis felt 
the great res·ponsibility and even greater possibilities when he wrote: 
lt is a great grief to me that I did not even see 
him once before he died; for at Paris I.was so young 
that it is really only in my heart that I.retain any 
remembrance of him. When I do wrong, if I think of 
th!s great~ I.seem to feel his spirit within me 
bidding m~ make myself ~orthy of the name Napoleon.35 
After fighting with the Carbonari, a setret society dedicated to 
the freedom of Italy, Louis Napoleon began a series of pamphlets 
elaborating on the gospel of St. Helena, mixing it with the current 
trends of republicanism and socialism to put his name before the people. 
In 1832 he published Political Reflections as his first public assertion 
for the position of a possible candidate of the imperial heritage •. He 
wrote ~ A:i:-tiller;yman's Handbook in 1834 and had it distributed among 
ranking army officers in France to remind them that another Napoleon 
also prepared his way with artillery. His most significant work was 
Napoleonic Ideals, published in London in 1839 while he was in exile 
after the failure of his attempted coup at Strasbourg on October 31, 
1836. From the acts and the alleged opinions of the Emperor, Louis 
concocted a doctrine that was somewhat arbitrary but attractive. It 
exploited the discontent with the government of Louts Philippe by 
reviving nostalgic memories of imperial glory and outlined changes in 
the system of government which he sincerely believed the people of 
France needed and wanted. A.restored empire was the ideal mode of 
government for France, and only an emperor elected by a plebiscite 
expressing the national will could reconcile freedom for the people 
with orderly and efficient government. He said, 11Tl;i.e name Napoleon is 
a complete program in itself; ie stands f9r order, authority, religion, 
the welfare of the people within; without for national dignity. 1136 
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Aftei the fiasco at Boulogne on August 6, 1840, Louis' cause 
remained quiet until the Revolution of 1848. This upheaval gave him 
the chance to ~nter into French politics, and he was elected as a 
representative to the Assembly. The publicity he received presented 
him as a soldier who had risen to the defense of order against social 
chaos. Victor Hugo contributed to that idea: "He is not a prince, he 
is an idea. The man whom the people have ju?~ chosen is not the 
37 pretender •••• He is.the hero who won at Jena •••• 11 
On December 2, 1848, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte became President of 
the Second French Republic. His call for order was vital in his victory, 
but even more important was the name Napoleon. His many publications 
had given his name a program, and this program had something to offer 
all classes. His rise continued, resulting in the plebiscite of 
December 1852, when he became Napoleon III. 
Napoleon III turned sentimental Napoleonism into practical 
Bonapartism, which was based on French supremacy and the principle of 
h . 38 aut ority. The Legend actively guided the new Emperor--especially in 
his foreign policy. The first goal of Napoleon III was the re-
establislunent of France's place and prestige in Europe and the destruc-
tion of the treaties of 1815. That worried Europe, but the Emperor 
declared, 11L1 Empire c'est paix, 11 to reassure the jittery Continent. 
The Uncle had said, "Let the people rule!" and the Nephew echoed the 
same sentiment. Let the people form themselves freely into national 
groups, and the doctrine of nationalities became a key in the policy of 
the new Emperor. Louis Napoleon thought of Europe as a political and 
economic unit; the idea was a federation. He continually attempted to 
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convene European congresses to settle common problems and encourage the 
most pr~ctical forms for international cooperation. 
The establishment of the Second Empire fulfilled Napoleon's 
prophecy: 
In the course of time, nothing ~ill be thought so fine, 
or strike the attention so much, as the doing of 
justice to me •••• I shall gain ground everyday in the 
minds of the peo~le. My name will become the star of 
their rights •••• 9 
Napoleon III set out to accomplish the avowed goals ·of his uncle and 
those of his own to better France and Europe. He believed in the 
dictates of the Legend, and sought an opportunity to right the wrongs 
against Napoleon and France. This opportunity came in the dispute in 
1853 over the Eastern Question involving ·Russia, the Ottoman Empire and 
France and evolved into the Crimean War. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CRIMEAN ADVENTURE 
When Louis Napoleon proclaimed the revival of the French Empire 
in 1852, the rest of Europe waited attentively to see what would happen. 
The restoration of a member of Napoleon's dynasty to the throne of 
France presented a serious challenge to one of the treaties of 1815, 
which had been signed along with the Second Treaty of Paris on 
November 20, 1815, and had forbidden that exact occurrence. But no 
resistance came from the European Powers; the sovereign of England and 
then, reluctantly, the Austrian Emperor and the Prussian King addressed 
Napoleon III as 11~ frere," recognizing the Empire in France. Only 
Nicholas I of Russia remained recalcitrant and persisted in addressing 
Napoleon as 11~ ~"· 
As Emperor of the French, Napoleon III had certain specific goals 
in mind for France's foreign policy. Chief among them was his desire to 
destroy the treaties of 1815, which had humiliated France and overthrown 
his uncle. The dictates of the Napoleonic Legend, which Louis used as 
the basis of his policy, also called for the restoration of French power 
on the Continent. Along with these goals, the new Emperor also made a 
conscious effort to continue the traditional foreign policy of France, 
and among the 11trad;ltions 11 was the championship of the privileged posi-
1 tion of Latin monks in the Holy Land. In following this policy 
Napoleon supported the Catholic monks in a series of disputes which had 
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arisen over the rights and privileges as custodians of the Holy Places 
between the Latin and Greek monks. This quarrel ulti~ately led to the 
Crimean War, 1854-1856, which was ostensibly fought for the preserva-
tion of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but actually to halt 
Russian encroachment in the area. 
For centuries France had been the legal protector of the Catholic 
pilgrims en route to the Holy Land, and sever~l Latin orders had been 
established in Palestine to care for the shrines. But the Latin monks 
had neglected their duties; these were assumed by the Greek monks, who 
appropriated many of the privileges and were confirmed in this by 
several firmans, or edicts, from the Sultan. In 1840 events turned 
.. French attention eastward and made certain groups shrine-conscious. In 
the decade of the 1840s French claims on behalf of the Latin monks to 
repair certain shrines were advanced with the support of the new Pope, 
Pius IX. The Greek monks resented what they considered an incursion of 
their rights. When Napoleon reasserted the French position in the 
dispute between the Latin and Greek monks, he was continuing French 
policy in response to clerical pressure and as a bid for support from 
the strong Catholic party in France. 2 Napoleon's Foreign Minister, 
Edouard Droyn de Lhuys, pointed out that the clerics had made the Latin 
claims a question of national honor., which Napoleon felt he had to 
uphold or lose prestige. In 1850 the French envoy in Constantinople 
pressed for a settlement to restore the ~rivileges to the Latin monks, 
and in 1851 the French threat to break off diplomatic relations ~oved 
the Porte to make a favorable decision. The Turks acquiesced to the 
French demands, but the diplomatic victory on the part of France wounded 
deeply the pride of Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia and Protector of the 
Orthodox Faith. 
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By December, 1852, the Russians faced a loss of some of the Greek 
Orthodox privileges in the Near East, and in Europe the Tsar was faced 
with the diminution of his influence in the face of the "upstart" 
Emperor whose country the conservative members of the Holy Alliance had 
successfully kept isolated on the European diplomatic scene for at 
least twenty years. Nicholas had used the rivalry between Great Britain 
and France to convince the British statesmen that Russian and British 
interests in the Near East were identical. He visited England in June, 
1844, and engaged in confidential talks with the leading statesmen, 
Lord Aberdeen, the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel, concerning 
the state of the Ottoman Empire. These talks, summarized in the 
Nesselrode Memorandum written by the Russian chancellor on his return 
to St. Petersburg, culminated in a proposal for an Anglo-Russian agree-
ment to maintain the existing order in Turkey. If anything unforeseen 
should happen to the Ottoman Empire the two countries would come to a 
previously agreed-upon understanding for a common course of action. 3 A 
review of the circumstances of this Anglo-Russian entente is necessary 
for an understanding of the French posture in the Near East. 
Aberdeen replied cautiously to the Memorandum, since he disagreed 
with the Tsar's main thesis that Turkey was crumbling to pieces. But 
Nicholas, on his part, assumed that he had a British commitment upon far 
more than Aberdeen was willing to admit. The Nesselrode Memorandum was 
passed from ministry to ministry in the years 1844-1852, 4 and it 
continued to be the basis of Russian foreign policy towards Turkey. 
At the end of 1852, Baron von Brunnow, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
informed Lord John Russell that Russi~·. would back up her demands for 
the restoration of the Greek privileges to the Porte with aggressive 
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action to forestall French preponderance in Turkey. At this point the 
Tsar made two important advances: he opened new secret conversations 
with Sir Hamilton Seymour, British envoy at St. Petersburg, concerning 
the completion of the plans for a peaceful partition of Turkey) and 
early in February, 1853, Prince Menshikof was ordered to Constantinople 
to take up Russian negotiations with the Porte. 
The conversations with Seymour began on January 9, 1853, at a 
palace reception beneath the glittering lights and in the midst of 
throngs of people. The Tsar attempted to persuade England to agree to 
a partition of the Ottoman Empire to avoid the chaos and confusion which 
would inevitably result from the unexpected and unprepared for collapse 
5 of Turkey. The Tsar dwelled on the invalid state of the Ottoman Empire 
and the necessity of reaching an understanding ori its ultimate parti-
tion. At the second meeting he reno.unced the designs of Catherine the 
Great on Constantinople but reaffirmed Russian interest in the plight of 
the Orthodox Christians in the Turkish lands. As for the other states 
of Europe, "If England and I agree, I care little for the rest or what 
the others do or think ••• ," he declared. 6 
Seymour conununicated Nicholas' views to the Prime Minister with the 
comment that he believed that th.e Tsar intended to occupy Constantinople 
should the Empire fall. In his r~ply, Russell opined that the fall of 
Turkey was not as imminent as Nicholas had predicted and warned that 
forecasting the sickness of friends opten caused their death. In short, 
he refused to do anything relative to the eventual partition of Turkey, 
especially in view of the friendly overtures of Napoleon III. 7 
In February of 1853, Menshikof went to Constantinople as 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Tsar. Although he 
27 
was allowed a certain amount of latitude in his dealings with the 
Porte, his instructions were definite: he was to secure guarantees for 
the future. With the Menshikof Mission, the local problem of the Holy 
Places turned into a major European concern involving the integrity of 
th Ot E . 8 e toman mpire. 
Menshikof acted in a very bellicose manner upon his arrival in 
Constantinople and precipitated a ministerial crisis. With both of the 
English and French ambassadors absent from their posts, Colonel Rose 
and M. Benedetti, charges d'affaires for their respective countries, 
feared that a whole new cabinet would be fanned under Russian auspices. 
In his alann Benedetti telegraphed to Paris asking for the French fleet 
to be sent to the Aegean Sea. He also stated that Colonel Rose had 
ordered the British squadron to leave Malta for the open sea. Public 
opinion, led by an ag~ressive Parisian press, forced the Emperor to 
send the French fleet from Toulon to Salamis, but the British govermnent, 
upon the Tsar 1 s and Nesselrode.'s assurances, judged Rose's alanns as 
excessive and kept their fleet at Malta. England's refusal acted as a 
restraint on France; it showed Napoleon that he had to be sure of the 
9 actions of England before he made a step in the Near East. 
Meanwhile, Menshikof presented his demands to the Sultan's 
ministers. The returned English Ambassador, Stratford de Redcliffe, 
who had the confidence of the Turks, advised them to separate the 
Russian demands into two parts: those concerning the Holy Places and 
those which called for a Sened, or treaty, for a secret alliance between 
Russia and the Porte. The French and Russian'representatives reached 
an understanding about the Holy Places in late April. But on May 5, 
Prince Menshikof sent another ultimattnn to the Porte which demanded the 
acknowledgement of a Russian protectorate over the Christian subjects 
10 of the Porte. This would have allowed the Tsar to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Upon Stratford's advice, the 
Turks refused. After a short delay in which he tried to intimidate 
them, Menshikof left Constantinople with all of the personnel of the 
Russian embassy. 
The outcome of the mission and the military and naval maneuvers 
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in January, 1853, drew France and England closer together to the delight 
of Napoleon, who had worked hard for a Franco-British entente. They 
regarded these actions as a potential threat ~o the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. Paris had been forecasting the problem since early 
April despite Nesselrode's pacific assurances. Public opinion in 
England exploded in favor of the Sultan. Keeping :in mind their own 
Mediterranean interests, the French and British fleets were ordered to 
advance to Besika Bay. 
The Tsar's next move was a threat. On May 31, he warned that if 
Turkey refused to sign the last note within eight days, Russian troops 
would cross the frontier, not to wage war but to obtain a material 
guarantee for the satisfaction of the Tsar 1 s demands. Turkey refused, 
and the Russian troops crossed the Pruth River in the early part of 
J 1 d id h D b . pi . l' . 11 u y an occup e t e anu ian r ncipa 1t1es. 
During the next months, the main international concern was directed 
toward the prevention of an outbreak of hostilities .between the two 
countries. At the invitation of Count Buol, the Austrian Premier, the 
representatives of France, England, and Prussia met at Vienna to come 
up with the basis of agreement satisfactory to the countries involved. 
Napoleon took the initiative by drafting a note which, with a few 
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changes, was adopted by the Four Powers. The Vienna Note was a vague 
re-assertion of the previous treaties and practically conceded that 
the Orthodox Church should enjoy the same rights as the Latin Churches. 
When Nicholas accepted it, Europe sighed in relief. However, it was 
not acceptable to the Porte. Stratford pushed for its acceptance even 
though he did not approve of it, but Turkey demanded amendments which 
12 Nicholas refused to contenance. France and Britain were very dis-
appointed that the Porte had turned down the Note after Russia had 
agreed to it. Clarendon, the British Foreign Minister, accused 
Stratford of prejudicing the situation in Constantinople, and Napoleon 
did not conceal his displeasure from Lord Cowley, the English 
Ambassador in Paris. 13 
All of this was interrupted when Nesselrode unofficially published 
a "violent interpretation" of the Vienna Note which confirmed to the 
Turkish fears for their independence by stating that the vagueness of 
the Note would enable Russia to interpret it in any manner in their 
14 
favor. The diplomatic situation quickly altered in favor of the 
Porte, and France and England moved closer toward the alliance which 
Napoleon wanted so much. In September, 1853, Napoleon III recommended 
that the combined fleets move through the Dardanelles towards 
C • l 15 onstantinop e. Clarendon agreed, and instructions were sent to the 
French and British representatives in the Turkish capital. 16 Although 
Napoleon initiated the action, he was forced to profess a desire for 
peace to satisfy the overwhelming wish of the French people. 
The Porte, however, seemed bent on war to appease its own public 
opinion, and on October 4, 1853, sent an ultimatum to Russia. 17 Russia 
replied by a declaration of war on November 1. Although war had been 
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declared, there was not much military action until November 30 when the 
Russians mounted a surprise attack on the Turkish squadron in the Bay 
of Sinope. The 11Sinope Massacre" was viewed by contemporary opinion in 
France and England as a further threat to Turkey, as a breach of 
promise, and as a defiance of the allied fleets anchored in the 
Bosphorous. It rendered the entrance of France and England into the 
fl . . . bl 18 con ict 1nev1ta e. 
The British demanded war. As The Times expressed iti "England, 
after peace for fourteen years_, goes perhaps to restore in the hazards 
of combat her honor and her fortune. 1119 In France the reaction was 
different; the people wanted peace. Napoleon had to veconcile his 
subjects to war with an alliance with a nation whom France disliked and 
against a nation which she did not want to fight. But the English 
alliance was one of the foundations of Napoleon's policy and one he had 
tried to achieve since he came to power. 
Throughout the period, Napoleon constantly favored dramatic action 
and the advance of the naval squadrons. He had increased tensions by 
sending the French fleet to Salamis in March and had led in the demand 
to move the combined fleets into the Dardanelles. Now he called for 
the fleets to move into the Black Sea to guarantee Turkish integrity 
and neutralize the Russian power. 20 The British cabinet had to agree. 
Despite his aggressive action, Napoleon was understandably reluc-
tant to enter into a war from which France would not likely gain any 
21 material advantage. With strong public opinion for peace and the 
erratic response of the Bourse to the threat of war, Napoleon made a 
final appeal to the Tsar in a personal letter of January 29, 1864. He 
proposed that the hostilities should end and that direct negotiations 
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between Russia and Turkey begin. Nicholas replied with a taunt, 
declaring that the Russian armies would repeat their victories of 1812. 
Napoleon had hoped for better results from the letter, and was 
disappointed at the failure of his personal attempt to reconciHation" 22 
But stung by this rebuff, the French government had no other choice but 
to begin military preparations and to join Great Britain in the ultima--
tum that made war J.nevitable on February 27, 1854, 23 
The material interests of France in the Near East at this time 
were limited, although as a great power she was interested in the effects 
which the partition of Turkey might have on the balaih:e of pow~r. Bvt 
the issues were complicated by the personal relations of the two 
Emperors; each wanted to be the dominant force in European politics and 
each felt a grJ.evance against the other.. Napoleon needed an active 
foreign policy to satisfy his nation: s need for glory,. A victory over 
Russia would be revenge for 1812 and a blow at the champion of the 
hai:ed Holy Alliance. While on St. Helena, Napoleon I had predicted that 
Russia would strike at Turkey and upset the European balance of power. 
Napoleon III saw that it was his duty to prevent such an occurance. 
During the course of the war these considerations seemed uppermost 
in Napoleon)s mindo The Crimean campaign is notorious as one of the 
most inglorious episodes in military history. The Allies were handi-
capped by inadequate transportation, poor leadership, and disease. 
Napoleon came up with the plan to attack the symbol of Russian power in 
the East, the stronghold of Sebastopol, but the siege proved long and 
costly. The stalemate was such that Napoleon felt the need of a~ 
~!:. ~" In February, 1855, he announced his intention to go to the 
24 
theater of war himself and assume personal command. Everyone was 
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·against the idea. In France his supporters feared that hi~ prolonged 
absence might jeopardize his throne. Moreover, Britain would never 
permit him to take command of her troops. The English took advantage 
of the imperial visit to London in April to persuade him to abandon 
his plans. Napoleon bowed to the opinions of the French and English 
. . d h . 25 ministers an gave up t e proJect. 
Meanwhile, the Powers tried unsuccessfully to settle the war 
diplomatically, but a victory on the battlefield was required to break 
the stalemate. Finally, in September, 1855, the victory came with the 
fall of Sebastopol, and France favored an immediate peace. 26 Her armies 
had born the brunt of the war, and the unsettled financial situation 
at home reinforced the popular desire for peace. France had achieved 
her glory, such as it was; Napoleon's prestige in Europe had been 
greatly enhanced. In the country's view nothing else could be 
accomplished. Britain, on the other hand, favored a continuation of the 
war. Her forces were at least organ~zed and ready to conduct another 
campaign. Moreover, national pride demanded a clear-cut English 
victory. But Napoleon advocated a settlement and used the threat of 
opening the nationalities question, which would disrupt the European 
equilibrium by dealing with the unification problems of Italy, Poland 
and the Rhine provinces--a situation which England did not want--if the 
British government refused peace. 27 
Austria, who had refused to fight, again took the diplomatic 
initiative after the failure of her first attempt. Hoping to restore 
her place as the negotiator, Austria sent an ultimatum based on the 
Four Points to Russia on December 16, 1855. 28 Nicholas had died during 
the course of the war and had been succeeded by his son, Alexander II, 
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who hesitantly agreed to the formula. Paris was designated by the 
common agreement of all the countries concerned as the site for the 
peace congress, which was a great advantage for the Emperor. Napoleon 
hoped that the Congress of Paris would atone for the Congress of Vienna 
and that its settlement would replace the one of 1815. 
The plenipotentiaries began to arrive in mid-February, 1856. Baron 
von Brunnow and Count Orlof represented Russia; Lords Cowley and 
Clarendon represented England. Clarendon was justifiably suspicious of 
a union between France and Russia and wanted to guard the fruits of 
victory. Baron Buol came from Austria with an ardent desire that 
Prussia be admitted to the Congress and the Sardinian envoy, Count 
Camillo Cavour, not be admitted. The minister of the Porte, Ali-Pasha, 
was, like his country, largely forgotten in the deliberations. French 
Foreign Minister Walewski was elected as President of the Congress to 
honor their host, Napoleon III, at the first meeting of the Congress of 
February 25, 1856. 
The meetings were rarely long. Most of the arrangements were made 
in private conversations, The Emperor's fascinating personality 
captivated and influenced most of the plenipotentiaries. Much to 
England's dismay, Napoleon was visibly inclined toward Russia, although 
he did not want to abandon the English alliance. During the Congress, 
Eugenie gave birth to the Prince Imperial. Napoleon's joy knew no 
bounds. He had an heir to carry on the Bonaparte dynasty, and he, the 
parvenu, had re~established French hegemony in Europe. 
The plenipotentiaries signed the Treaty of Paris on March 30, 1856. 
Generally, the terms 'Were in accord with the Four Points of Vienna. They 
provided for the evacuation and restoration of all occupied 
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territories. The Porte was admitted to the Concert of Europe, and 
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed by the 
Great Powers. The Black Sea was neutralized and the Danube River was 
open to all navigation, while the Principalities remained under 
Ottoman suzerainty. 
Napoleon had entered into a war in which the tangible gains were 
negligible and for which there was little popular enthusiasm. One 
important victory had satisfied France's and the Bonapartist need for 
military glory and honor. Commerical interest in the Near East did not 
call for a war against Russia, nor was the personal conflict between 
Nicholas and Napoleon bitter enough to cause a war by itself. Although 
Napoleon did not deliberately provoke a war, he initiated the origin of 
the dispute by championing the Latin monks in the dispute over the Holy 
Places. The measures he had taken were dangerous, since he felt that 
he had to placate French opinion with striking and dramatic action. 
Once he took an aggressive stand, he could not back down without the 
loss of prestige, which was so vital for his reign. But while his 
actions pushed him towards war, he either personalJy made or supported 
several attempts to avert the war. He encouraged settlement through 
the Concert of Europe and wrote a personal letter to the Tsar in an 
effort to avoid the conflict. But other factors had complicated the 
situation, and these made war inevitable. 
Napoleon gained a great deal. from the successful outcome of the 
Crimean adventure. The war had assured his position in Europe, which 
had been uncertain in 1853. His influence was overwhelming on the 
I Continent; henceforth, he was The Emperor in Europe. Napoleon was at 
the pinnacle of his power; he was successful abroad and popular at home, 
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even in Paris. No power in Europe would not welcome his alliance. The 
valor of the French soldier had re-established her influence on the 
Continent. Napoleon had caused the treaties of 1815 to be revised to 
France's advantage. By recognizing Napoleon as one of the leading 
rulers in Europe, the other rulers considered the agreement to prevent 
a Bonaparte from ruling France as obsolete. In discussing the problems 
of Italian nationality, Austrian power in the peninsula granted to her 
by the First Treaty of Paris in 1814 was questioned, again striking at 
the core of the hated treaties. Napoleon believed that the defeat of 
Russia avenged in part Napoleon the Great 1 s defeat in 1812 and was a 
blow against the originator of the Holy Alliance. In the Emperor's view, 
any attack on the treaties of 1815 benefited France and his dynasty. 
The cost of the war was staggering, but so were the moral benefits for 
the Napoleonic dynasty and France. The glory and the Continental power 
of France figured as a key point in the Napoleonic Legend. With the 
successful completion of the Crimean War,: the French victory at 
Sebastopol restored military glory to France and helped wipe out the 
memory of Waterloo. The significance of the conference of the Great 
Powers taking place in Paris escaped few; French influence was again 
dominant in Europe. Napoleon III was satisfied with the effect of his 
first important military and diplomatic venture. The dictates of the 
Napoleonic Legend had been followed to a successful conclusion. 
Napoleon firmly believed in the advocacy of the principle of 
nationalities. In a separate session of the Congress on April 8, 
Napoleon III caused the plight of Italy to be discussed among the Great 
Powers. Throughout the session, although nothing concrete was 
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accomplished, Napoleon's whispered promise to the Italian delegate at 
the conference, "Tell them that my name is Bonaparte •••• " was a portent 
29 of things to come. 
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CHAPTER III 
NAPOLEON III AND TUE UNIFICATION OF 
ITALY, 1856-1860 
The Italian Question had long been an obsession with Napoleon III. 
It was, in part, a matter of sentiment: he had fought for Italian 
liberty in 1830, and his uncle's first successes had taken place there. 
He believed that his position would never be secure until the hated 
treaties of 1815 were destroyed, and Louis Napoleon hoped to overturn 
1 the settlement of 1815 in Italy. The principle of nationality had a 
powerful attraction to the Imperial idealist as well. He believed that 
of all the great powers, only France had nothing to fear from the 
implementations of the principle and hoped to use it as a weapon against 
the treaties of the Congress in Vienna. Napoleon wanted to redraw the 
map of Europe in accordance with the principle of nationalities, for 
only on this basis could a political equilibrium be achieved. The 
idea had come from St. Helena, and Napoleon III embraced it as one of 
h . l' . 2 is po icies. 
As early as 1848, when he first came into power, Louis Napoleon 
looked for some way to help Italy. But, as he remarked to an Italian 
friend, "Give me time first to get things to rights in France, and then 
3 we will see what we can do for Italy." The long awaited opportunity 
came in March, 1856, at the peace conference at the close of the 
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Crimean War. Napoleon III was at the pinnacle of his power; his 
policies had brought glory to France and French hegemony in Europe. He 
·now could see what he could do for Italy. 
But another.man was also actively working for the Italian cause--
Count Camillo Cavour, Prime Minister to the King of Piedmont-Sardinia, 
Victor Emmanuel. Cavour worked constantly for the Italian cause but 
realized the need for a strong ally--either France or England--and for 
this purpose joined the Allies in the Crimean War. Despite Austria's 
efforts to exclude Sa~dinia, Cavour attended the peace congress at 
Paris. 
In response to Napoleon's earlier question, 11What can I do for 
Italy?" Cavour outlined the following four simple proposals which pro-
vided the basis for an Italian program at the Congress: 1) to urge 
.Austria to deal fairly with Piedmont by permitting the junction of the 
Lombardy and Piedmont railroad and regulating the police system which 
harassed connnercial and personal relations between the two countriesJ 
2) to obtain from her a milder rule in Lombardy and Venetia by intro-
ducing beneficial reforms in the laws and administration; 3) to force 
the King of Naples to cease scandalizing Europe by his tyrannical 
conduct, which was contrary to all principles of justice and equity; 
4) to reform the Papal states by removing t1:ie Austrian troops from 
Romagna and establishing an independent, temporal administration of the 
4 states. 
Although Piedmont's place at the Congress was not specifically 
defined, Cavour's diplomacy assured his place. He spoke little during 
the regular meetings, but at the balls and receptions accompanying the 
Congress he worked hard to sway Napoleon and Lord Clarendon to the 
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Italian cause. He finally got his chance to air the Italian Question 
at a special session on April 8, 1856. Count Walewski opened the 
discussion with a mild criticism of the presence of Austrian troops in 
Central Italy and the corrµpt state of government in Naples and Rome. 
Clarendon's speech, on the other hand, was extremely harsh, as he 
condemned the Austrian policy. The Austrian plenipotentiary, Baron 
Buol, was furious; Cavour was triumphant. Knowing that Clarendon's 
vigorous onslaught needed no further support, Cavour presented his case 
5 moderately but effectively. 
No concrete proposals came from the session, but the moral gain 
for Italy was enormous: Cavour came to be regarded as the representa-
tive oLall Italy, not merely that of Sardinia, and Austria, whose 
whole policy had been based upon acting as the arbiter in Italian 
affairs, found herself suspect and discredited. Cavour phrased it in 
this manner before the Sardinian Chamber: 
Thus, the abnormal and unhappy condition of Italy 
has been exposed to Europe, not by furious and 
revolutionary demagogues, not by party men, but by the 
representatives of the first nations of Europe. The 
second advantage obtained consists in those powers 
having declared that it was in the interest of Europe 
that the evils of'Italy has been brought before the 
tribunal of public opinion, whose decision, to use 
the noble expression of the Emperor of the French, is 
without appeal.6 
Cavour came away from the Congress with the realization that Napoleon 
III would be the only possible champion of Italy on the battlefield; 
from that point on, he made a military alliance with France his primary 
goal. 
However, Napoleon might have continued with his half-formed ideas 
on the reorganization of Europe if a startling event had not occurred. 
At 8:30 in the evening of January 14, 1858, three bombs exploded as 
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Napoleon and Eugenie drove to the Opera. 187 bystanders were killed or 
7 wounded, but the Imperial Couple escaped unharmed. The police quickly 
arrested the conspirators, all Italian revolutionaries: Felice Orsini, 
G. Piere, A. Gomez and c. di Rudio. 
As soon as the first panic had passed and Napoleon's initial out-
burst against England and Sardinia's willingness to harbor exiles had 
subsided, the Orsini plot spurred the Emperor into more practical 
sympathy for Italy. Napoleon saw that this offered him an opportunity 
to influence public opinion favotably toward his Italian schemes. 8 He 
wisely directed that the conspirators should be given a fair trial, 
appointed able advocates to defend them, and ordered that their testi-
many be published. Orsini I s trial became popular in Paris·. 
From his jail cell, Orsini wrote two dramatic letters to the 
Emperor. Before the assassination attempt Orsini believed that Napolem 
stood in the.way of the Italian cause and his death would act as a 
catalyst to begin the revolution. But from his cell, Orsini realized 
his mistake, as he wrote: 
The present state of Europe makes you the arbiter 
of whether Italy is free or the slave of Austria and 
other foreigners. I would not ask that French blood be 
shed for Italians. W~ ask simply that France should 
not intervene against us, and should not allow other 
nations to intervene in the struggle against Austria ••• 
The happiness or unhappiness of my country depends on 
you, and so does the life or death of a nation to 
which Europe owes so much of its civilization. Veliver 
my country and th~ blessings of 25 million people go 
with you forever. 
Napoleon published the letters witn::their appeal to liberate Italy. The 
British Ambassador, Lord Cowley, , expressed his astonishment that : .. 
Napoleon should feel sympathy for the conspirator and think about 
pardoning him. lO But Napoleon was touched by the scene of a man dying 
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for his convictions, and the episode reminded him of his own youth 
twenty-seven years earlier--also willing to die for Italy. It 
strengthened the Emperor's resolve to do something for Italy. Orsini, 
in a very dramatic scene, died on the scaffold. 
The result of the Orsini plot was to galvanize Napoleon into 
action. What better place than Italy to win~ Glorie and in doing so, 
contribute to the destruction of the hated treaties of 1815. 11 His 
resentment against Austria, the symbol of the system established in 
1815, made it easier. The flagrant contradictions between the terms on 
which he held the throne of France--the good will and support 9f the 
Roman Catholics and the peace-loving peasantry--and his desire to 
liberate Italy were brushed aside. Near the end of May, 1858, the 
Emperor sent Dr. Conneau, his physician and personal friend, secretly 
to Turin to invite Cavour to meet Napoleon when he went to take the 
waters at Plombieres in July. 
The first interview took place on July 20, 1858. Cavour had come 
from Switzerland, and entered France secretly. He was inunediately 
greeted by the Emperor. Napolaon declared his intention to help 
. 
Sardinia fight Austria if a non-revolutionary cause which would justify 
the war to public opinion in France and Europe could be found. After a 
careful study of a map of the peninsula, they found the duchies of 
Massa and Carrara as a promising center for rebellion and a casus belli. 
Both the Pope and the King of Naples would be left alone; their people 
could take their own action. Napoleon insisted on this to avoid a 
rupture with the French clerics and the Russians, who championed the 
Ne~politan dynasty. Once Austria was driven completely from I~aly, the 
country would be organized into a confederation of four states under 
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the honorary presidency of the Pope. The four states would consist of 
the Kingdom of Upper Italy under the House of Savoy, the Papal States, 
a new Kingdom of Central Italy perhaps under the rule of the Emperor's 
cousin, Prince Napoleon, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
The question of compensation for France in the form of the 
acquisition of Savoy, and perhaps Nice, was important for the sake of 
French public opinion, although Napoleon deemed it as secondary. 
Napoleon believed that French security lay in liberating Italy, not in 
altering the boundaries. But by the acquisition of her "natural 
frontiers 11 .on the southeast, France was also destroying the treaties oj 
1815. 
Cavour was reluctant to agree to the proposed marriage of Victor 
Emmanuel's daughter, Clothilde, to Prince Napoleon, but Napoleon was 
adamant on that point, since he wanted his cousin suitably married into 
this ancient dynasty. Cavour finally had to agree to persuade his king 
12 to favor the plan. 
The agreement at Plombieres, like the Treaty of Paris, 1856, aimed 
at overthrowing the principles of 1815. On Napoleon's side it was very 
personal: this plan would exchange French for Austrian hegemony in 
Italy, and a successful war would strengthen the dynasty at home. His 
actions were in line with the doctrine of nationality, a principle 
which fascinated him. He had found his doctrine, and it remained for 
him to apply it to the reconstruction of Europe. 
Plombieres provided the Emperor the opportunity to avenge the 
failure of Napoleon the Great, He had humbled Russia at the Crimea and 
"conquered" England with diplomacy. Austri~ remained untouched, and 
Austria was the power which prevented the satisfaction of nationality 
in Italy. Success in Italy would provide Napoleon witnmultiple 
13 victories. 
Prince Napoleon traveled to Turin in September on the pretext of 
arranging his marriage to Clothilde, but in reality his mission lay 
in bringing the treaties for signature. The treaty called for an 
offensive and defensive alliance between France and Piedmont with the 
14 aim to liberate Italy from the Austrian occupation. Even though 
45 
these negotiations were highly secret, the diplomatic circles of Europe 
began to become uneasy as they sensed that something was happening. 
Even Napoleon's own entourage, including the Empress, was terrified at 
the idea of a war. 
In January, 1859, two bombshells were dropped by Napoleon and 
Victor Etmnanuel which shook the diplomatic scene. At the New Year's 
Day reception at the Tuileries, Napoleon addressed Baron Hubner, the 
15 Austrian Ambassador, very brusquely. This event, coupled with 
Victor Etmnanuel's strong speech at the opening of the Piedmontese 
Parliament on January 10, made it clear that war would occur in the 
16 near future. The marriage of Victor Etmnanuel's sixteen-year-old 
daughter to the middle-aged rake, Prince Napoleon, offended Europe's 
sensibilities, but further cemented the alliance between the two 
countries. 
As February passed, the general feeling that was inevitable. grew 
stronger. On the fourth an anonymous pamphlet, 11The Emperor Napoleon 
III and Italy", startled Europe. After unfolding Napoleon's political 
philosophy, it presented practical steps towards the satisfaction of 
Italian nationality. The pamphlet served as .a warning to Europe as to 
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Napoleon's intentions, but he kept his true motives to himself. Cavour 
worried over the Frenchman's vacillations in the face of a strong 
French opinion for peace. He searched constantly for a situation which 
would matk Austria as the aggressor, a major stipulation for French 
entry into the war. 
Lord Malmesbury, British Foreign Minister at the time, worked hard 
to avoid an open break upon the grounds that the treaties of 1815 
should be respected. He was just one example of the European diplomats 
who insisted on the preservation of the settlement of 1815 despite the 
changes brought on by the Revolutions of 1848 and the Crimean War. 
Napoleon's situation became mere difficult at hemi9. The slt.unp on 
the Bourse due to rumors of war and the protests of the commercial 
classes combined with'.the diplomatic pressures to make him hesitate. 
His actions were in defiance of E.UrQpean publ1-e opinion and endangered 
his alliance with the French Catholics. The Emp~ess, p~e-Catholic, 
and his Foreign Minister, pro-Austrian, were adamant against his plans. 
In fact, Napoleon ~uld not fail to see how his personal interests and 
those of France did not coincide. 17 
Despite the prospects which dazzled the Emperor, Napoleo-n feared 
that a war with Austria would precipitate a war -on the Rhine against 
Prussia. Prince Napo_leon went to St. Petersburg to sound out the Tsar 
about neutrality in case of a Franco-Austrian co.n.flict. The entete he 
arranged provided that Napoleon 'Wt.>Uld not alter the European equilibritm 
or raise tensions alanning to Russ:La. In return Russia promised:to 
secure Prussian neutrality to obviate the necessity for Ft,ance to main-
tain a second front on the Rhine frontier. 18 
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In February Lord Malmesbury sent Lord Cowley to Vienna to find a 
peaceful settlement to the problem and keep the peace. But before any-
thing positive came from Cowley's attempt, Russia, at Napoleon's 
20 
suggestion, proposed a European congress to settle the matter. 
Napoleon saw in the congress a method to shift the moral responsibility 
of the war from Paris to Vienna. He also hoped to use the congress to 
create a favorable atmosphere for him to go to war with public opinion 
behind him. Unfortunately Austria errored by refusing to treat with 
Sardinia until that Italian country voluntarily began to disarm. 21 
Austria played into Napoleon's hands with this demand. 
At this point Cavour arrived in Paris in an effort to overcome the 
Emperor's hesitancy. In the two meetings he had with Napoleon, Cavour 
declared that Piedmont would consider the idea of disarmament only if 
she were admitted to the proposed congress on an equal fatting with the 
rest of the powers. Cavour, greatly angered at the turn of events, 
threatened that if Napoleon backed down he would resign and publish the 
letters he had received from the Emperor showing his complicity. But 
the admission of Piedmont to the conference posed quite a problem. It 
would be a tacit admission that Piedmont was a great power, a thing 
which Austria would never tolerate. But the difficulty of trying to 
solve the Italian problem without the Italian power concerned also 
ld f . l 22 wou prove ruit ess. 
Britain suggested a compromise plan for a ·general and simultaneous 
disarmament of the Sardinian and Austrian ~roops along the Piedmont-
Lombardy border. In mid-April, Napoleon, under great diplomatic 
pressure from around Europe, ordered Cavour to accept this plan, 
Cavour had to agree. This compromise did not please Austria, who wanted 
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to disarm Piedmont by Austrian threats rather than by diplomatic 
persuasion. Thus Austria sent a stern ultimatum to Piedmont demanding 
disarmament. This threat, sent to Cavour on April 18, 1859, was a 
disguised declaration of war. 23 Austria had broken the peace. 
The stern Austrian ultimatum was a grave mistake, for it isolated 
her from her friends and condemned her in the eyes of European public 
. i 24 . op1n on. It provided Cavour with the casus belli he had been 
searching for and placed the fault with Austria. Tlle conditions of 
Plombieres were fulfilled: Sardinia was attacked, and the French 
alliance came into action. Napoleon, glad at last that the opportunity 
for decision and action had arrived, ordered his troops to Italy. The 
war suddenly became popular in Paris. France was enthusiastic for the 
noble and unselfish cause she was to uphold. 
A detailed explanation of the Italian campaigns is not necessary 
here. The Emperor, with a sµpreme gesture of Bonapartism, took connnand 
of the French forces. The Allies• plan was purely opportunistic. They 
went in search of the enemy, hoping to rout him in a decisive battle. 
The Allies won their first victory at ~genta on June 4. The real 
victory belonged to the stauchness of the French soldier who beat back 
the Austrian attack for thre.e hours before driving them from the plains 
25 of Lombardy. The road.was open to Milan. On June 8, 1859, Napoleon 
III and Victor Emmanuel triumphantly entered the city. The Emperor was 
hailed as Italy's hero. 
The next important battle was at Solferino on June 24. The victory 
seemed to assure the early successful conclusion of the war. But the 
Austrian armies were still intact and further battles would be necessary 
to free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic" as N~poleon had promised. 
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As the Emperor visited several parts of the battlefield, he was horror 
striken. The ground was covered with the dead, and the cries of the 
wounded filled the air. 
At this point several considerations were brought to the attention 
of the Emperor. Not only did the sickness and death of battle unnerve 
him, but the news from Paris and the rest of Europe was not good: 
Queen Victoria voiced her suspicions concerning the future actions of 
the Emperor, but more alarming was the news from Eugenie that the 
Prussians were massing troops behind the Rhine. 26 All of Europe 
watched his success suspiciously. He also found himself unwittingly 
aiding the forces of revolution, as revolts broke out in the duchies of 
Central Italy as the victorious troops marched into Venetia. 
As a result of these factors and his own limitations, Napoleon 
proposed an armistice to Franz Joseph on July 5, 1859. Six days later 
the two Emperors met at Villafranca. Napoleon rode to greet Franz 
Joseph, acting as a host rather than as a victor. The two men discussed 
the problems, and the armistice was signed. The conditions included the 
agreement to the creation of an ItaJian confederation under the 
honorary presidency of the Pope; Austria ceded its claim to Lombardy 
to France which would be transferred to Piedmont; Venetia would enter 
the confederation though remain a part of Austria; the Dukes of Modena 
and Tuscany would return to their states, and the Pope would be asked 
to reform the govermnent of the papal states. 27 
The news of Villafranca produced a panic in Italy. For the moment 
it seemed that, except for Lombardy, the victories of the war had been 
thrown away. What Napoleon had done for Italy was forgotten; only his 
broken promises were remembered. Victor Ermnanuel was stunned when he 
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the news after the fact, but remained grateful for Napoleon's help. 
Cavour was furious; he realized that every condition essential for 
Italy's unity was absent from the peace terms. I~ a fit of rage he 
resigned from his posts; Victor Emmanuel, stung by his minister's sharp 
attacks, accepted the resignation. 
However, once Napoleon had returned to France, he realized his 
mistake, but matters had become so complicated that there was not much 
he could do. H:i:.s motives for wianting peace were sound, but by ending 
the war so soon he had dashed the hopes for complete Italian liberation, 
to the disappointment of Italian patriots everywhere. Napoleon 
recognized too that while Cavour was working.for Italian unity under 
the Sardinian banner, he was concerned only for Italian liberty. As 
the war progressed, Cavour hoped to unite no~thern and central Italy 
under the House of Savoy, while Napoleon wanted to expel Austria from 
Italy and replace Austrian influence with French. The unity of Italy 
was not in France's interests, as he explained: 
I do not desire her [Italy's] unity, but only her 
independence, because unity would involve me in inter-
nal perils by reason of Rome, and France would not be 
pleased to see the rise, on her flank, of a great 
nation that might be able to diminish her influence.28 
And to Prince Richard Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, he declare~: 
My thought was grand and beautiful, my intensions 
pure and unself:ilsh. By invading Piedmont, you gave me 
a good pretext to realize a desire of my life, that of 
giving Italy to herself. I believed that Lhad 
succeeded at Villafranca; now I see that the whole 
affair is more difficult than before, and I am at the 
end of my rope.29 
Part of the difficulty lay in the problem of the Central Italian 
I 
states. Tl,tscany, Modena, Parma and Romagna had all revolted in favor 
of Piedmont and refused the return of their dukes. Cavour, back in 
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power, had set up temporary governments to prepare for their annexation 
to Piedmont. 
Napoleon's whole policy was against permitting Sardinia to annex 
Central Italy. All of the traditional precepts of French, fpreign policy 
' t th f t' f t I 1· k' d 3o were agains e orma ion o as rong ta ian ing om. But he 
realized that a federation was impossible and nothing short of force 
would compel the duchies to resist annexation. The Emperor found it 
necessary to reverse his position. He had again turned to the solution 
of proposing a congress to settle the problem of Central Italy, but 
realized a congress would·not find a successful answer. To sabotage 
the idea, another anonymous pamphlet appeared in December entitled, 
"The Pope and the Congress"~ This ended the idea since Austria refused 
to attend a congress which might further threaten the Pope. 
Napoleon tacitly agreed to the annexation if a plebiscite in 
Central Italy decided in favor of it and if France would receive com-
pensation in territory: Savoy and Nice would be the price for Central 
Italye However regrettable, Cavour believed that the cession of Savoy 
and Nice to be necessary to win French consent for the annexation of-
31 Central Italy. The plebiscite in Nice and Savoy showed an almost 
unanimous vote in favor of annexation to France as did the vote for 
Central Italy's annexation to Sardinia. 
The tale of Garibaldi's march and conquest from Naples to Rome 
cannot be told here, but by 1861 Italy was united except for Venetia 
and Rome. Without Napaleon 1 s help no~e of this would have been possible. 
Sardinia would never have had:"2lhe strength to fight Austria alone, and 
without his acquiescence Central Italy could not have been annexed. 
But most of Italy forgot all of that. 
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Napoleon lost in his Italian venture, while France gained. In 
acquiring Nice and Savoy he forfeited not only the good will but also 
the confidence and respect of England. Italy resented the cessions and 
remembered only the broken promises. By engaging in a war which 
threatened the Pope, he lost much of the support of one of the bulwarks 
of his reign--the French Catholics. He had hoped to;_replace Austrian 
hegemony in Italy with French influence, but succeeded instead in 
helping to create a strong Italian state, which had never been his 
intention. 
But the weaknesses were not yet apparent. The unification of 
Italy completed what the Crimean War had begun: the destruction of the 
European order based on the treaties of 1815. Napoleon supposed that a 
f h . k. k 0 • 1 32 I f• h ' f new system o is own ma ing was ta ing its pace. n ig ting or 
Italian liberty he was behaving and conforming with both the Napoleonic 
tradition and the Napoleonic Legend. That he should intervene to 
deliver Italy from Austria was consistent with his self-chosen role as 
the leader of the principle of nationality. 33 Despite the small cracks, 
French hegemony still reigned on the Continent, and Napoleon III was 
still The Emperor. The hated treaties of 1815 were destroyed, France 
was on her way to regaining her "natural boundaries." He had upheld 
his favorite principle and helped unite the Bonapartes 1 spiritual home. 
Napoleon seemed successful, but his greatest trial of strength lay 
ahead in his conflict with Prussia. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NAPOLEON III AND GERMAN UNIFICATION, 
1865-1870 
The decade of the 1860s proved to be very troublesome for Napoleon 
III. Discontent and dissatisfaction at home were growing in reaction 
to both his domestic and foreign policies. In following the principle 
of nationality, his plan of establishing French hegemony in Italy had 
backfired; he had helped create a strong, united Italy instead. He had 
also been persuaded to back the monarchial party in Mexico, wasting 
French men and resources in the ridiculous scheme to set up the 
Austrian Archduke Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico. His hopes to 
liberate Poland had estranged the Russian Tsar. Nothing seemed to work 
for him any longer; even his ,health was rapidly deteriorating, which 
seriously undermined his capabilities. Instead of enjoying a peaceful, 
prosperous reign, he was running into more and more difficulties. 
Even so, France still enjoyed a great deal of prestige in Europe; 
Paris was still the center of the Continent, and the French Imperial 
Court still set the fashions. In following the dictates of the 
Napoleonic Legend, Napoleon III had accomplished much: he had avenged 
his uncle's defeats, restored French power on the Continent, and 
brought glory and pro~perity to his country. He had taken one of the 
tenets of Bonapartism as his own--the principle of nationality--and 
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applied it successfully to Italy. The other main conglomeration of 
states destined for unity was G~rmany. 
Napoleon the Great claimed that he had initiated the process of 
unification in Germany by reducing its~ political complexity by 
reducing the number of states. The treaties of 1815 had ignored his 
constructive state by creating its own German confederation. If Louis 
Napoleon could help Germany break from the confining bonds of the out-
moded confederation, he would bury the last of the hated settlement. 
And if he received compensation in territory along the Rhine, perhaps 
the boundary of 1814, for his aid he would fulfill France's quest for 
her "natural boundaries"--the Alps, the Pyrenees and the Rhine. The 
time was ripe; Napoleon III turned to the German Question. 
Events were ready to be set into motion because of the actions of 
Otto von Bismarck, Prussian Minister President. He too sought the 
solution for the German Question, but his interpretation differed from 
the one of the French Emperor. He worked for German unity under 
Prussian auspices to the exclusion of Austrian and French interests • . 
Bismarck's first intention was to exclude Austria from German 
affairs when he had manipulated the Schleswig-Holstein Question to force 
Austria into an aggressive stand agai?st Prussia. But in his prepara-
tion to oust Austria from German affairs, Bismarck had to be sure of 
French neutrality. Napoleon,had always been favorably inclined toward 
Prussia, and his private convictions would be gratified by Prussia 
uniting Germany north of the Main River and French interests replacing 
Austrian influence among the South German states. 
Bismarck met Napoleon at Biarritz on October 6, 1865. The meeting 
was far from being a repetition of Plombieres, however. Both the French 
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Emperor and the Prussian statesman were anxious to keep the future 
open and to avoid conunitment. Bismarck was more desirous of preventing 
a French alliance with Austria than of obtaining one for himself. 
Bismarck made vague references to the Empire's future acquisition of 
the French-speaking lands of Belgium and Luxembourg in return for 
neutrality, but the essential bargain of Biarritz was French neutrality 
1 
in return for Venetia for Italy. Bismarck saw that Napoleon was 
obsessed with the idea of fulfilling the broken promises of 1859. As 
for Napoleon, he believed that any conflict between Austria and Prussia 
ld ' h ~ b 1 ' h' f 2 wou improve t e uropean a ance in is avor. 
Bismarck then turned his attention to forming an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Italy. Italy quickly obtained Napoleon's agree-
ment to the proposed alliance. The treaty was signed in April, 1866, 
and provided for a Prussian-Italian alliance for war against Austria, 
if war occurred within three months. The treaty assured that Austria 
would have to fight, since it made it impossible for her to strike a 
bargain. 
As the German conflict reached the critical stage in June, 
Austria felt that she had to deal with France. In the treaty between 
the two countries, Austria promised to cede Venetia even in case of 
victory in return for'French neutrality. German territorial revisions 
were left vague, and Austria agreed to accept the creation of a new 
Rhenish buffer state. Austria would receive a free hand in South German 
affairs. Logically, such a double policy should have called for a 
similar agreement with Prussia, but Napoleon shied away from a definite 
alliance. 3 France would seek a definite agreement with Prussia only 
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if the balance of power was threatened and she was compelled to secure 
her interests. 
In a war between Austria and Prussia, Napoleon expected a long 
struggle that would exhaust both of the belligerents. The resulting 
chaos would call for a new order, and he would be there to step between 
the combatants in his role as a arbiter· of Europe. Napoleon also 
counted on an Austrian victory, since she was supposedly the stronger 
of the two. The only unlooked-for possibility was a dramatic Prussian 
victory. 
When such an ovefwhelming P~ussian victory came at Sadowa on 
JUly 3, 1866, France was totally unprepared. The Emperor had not con-
sidered that the Prussian leadership and arms could be so superior that 
the road to Vienna would be open in less than six weeks. On the eve of 
the battle, ha had accepted the Austrian offer to mediate, but after 
Sadowa he had t9,reevaluate his policy in the light of the Prussian 
victory. Italy and Prussia were quickly notified of his offer to 
mediateo 
In the Council of Ministers, Empress Eugenie and Foreign Minister 
Droyn de Lhuys led the majority opinion which favored an active milita:cy 
policy. The paln was to back up Napoleon's proposed mediation by 
sending an army corps to the Rhine frontier. Napoleon favored the 
policy but before the orders were sent, he received the answering 
telegrams from William of Prussia and Victor Emmanuel accepting his 
offer for mediation and an armistice. These telegrams, the pleas from 
two of his ministers against the plan, and the overwhelming public 
sentiment against going to war convinced Napoleon against armed 
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d . . 4 me iation. This decision was important, as Bismarck intimated in his 
memoirs~ 
After the battle of Koniggratz [Sadowa] the situation 
was such that a favorable response on our part to the 
first advance of Austria with a view to peace negotiations 
was not only possible but seemed demanded by the inter-
ference of France. The success of Prussia compelled 
Napoleon to intervene for up to that time Napoleon had 
calculated on Prussia being defeated and in need for 
help.5 
And since French mediation wpuld not be accompanied by armed inter-
vention, Napoleon's efforts trailed away into mere diplomacy. Bismarck 
dictated the peace terms--both Franz Joseph and Napoleon had no other 
choice than to accept them. Venetia went to Italy despite that 
country's poor showing on the battlefield. Austria was excluded from 
the Confederation Prussia established from the states north of the 
Main and was expelled from German affairs. Napoleon insisted on the 
independence of the states south of the Main, but when he asked for 
the "reward" for his neutrality--the boundary of 1814--it was much too 
late to be effective. France received nothing. 
French opinion and vanity had been stung by the Prussian victory 
and by the Emperor's failure to preside over the readjustment in 
Central Europe. The process of German unification produced in Paris an 
anxiety bordering an panic. In.light of these outraged feeling, 
Droyn de Lhuys convinced Napoleon to embark on a_ policy of compensation. 
The Emperor was never entirely in favor, however, of acquiring 
territory inhabited py Germans. He believed in the principle of 
nationality--not in the desirability of acquiring foreign territory. 6 
He wished to destroy the treaties of 1815, and that had been accomplished 
by the dissolution of the German Confedera~ion. But, like his 
acquisition of Nice and S~voy, he felt it necessary to appease French 
public opinion, a factor which was so vital to his reign. 
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In the later summer of 1866 Napoleon had to give in to the demand 
for compensations. His most intimate advisors insisted that French 
opinion resented the aggradizement of Prussia at the expense of France 
and must be given some material satisfaction. On~July 26, 1866, 
Napoleon instructed Benedetti, his Ambassador in Berlin, to ask for the 
boundary of 1814. But the extreme anti-Prussian forces at court 
pushed the demands for further compensation. These were refused, as 
King William declared that he would not give away a single German 
village. 7 At this failure Napoleon dropped the idea of compensation 
and its creator, Droyn de Lhuys. Benedetti was theninstructed to 
propose two agreements to Berlin: a puQlic treaty conceding to France 
the boundary of 1814 and Luxembourg, and if that was refused he was to 
propose an offensive and defensive alli~nce between France and Prussia 
and to ask for the right for the eventual French annexation of Belgium. 
In return Prussia.would be given a 'free hand in Germany. On August 29, 
Bismarck received a handwritten draft of the treaty from Benedetti, 
which the wily Prussian kept for later use. 8 Bismarck evaded a direct 
answer to Benedetti 1 s proposals, but did say that the King would not 
object to the growth of the French Empire in the area of French 
nationality, but the Emperor would have to take the initiative. 
Unable to make any progress in negotiations with Prussia, in 
January, 1867, France began unilateral overtures to William III of the 
Netherlands to buy Luxembourg. Having failed to gain the Rhine frontier 
or Belgium, France put greater stress on Luxembourg. This became the 
last attempt at compensation--a residual of the claims of 1866. The 
Dutch King was willing to sell but, not wishing to offend a powerful 
neighbor, refused to conclude the agre.ement without the consent of 
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Prussia. German public opinion was aroused by a Bismarckian news leak. 
In playing the role of a German nationalist, Bi_smarck could not allow 
France to oust the Prussian garrison at the Luxembourg fortress, which 
had been authorized by the defunct German Confederation. 9 In a speech 
to the North German Parliament Bismarck attached the impending sale, 
and this heightened German public indignation further. lO 
Napoleon could not afford another diplomatic defeat. William III 
withdrew his offer to sell Luxembourg, and the Emperor changed his 
policy to insist the Prussia withdraw from the fortress. With most of 
his forces engaged in Mexico, Napoleon could not afford a war with 
Prussia despite bellicose demands for war from the Paris journals. 
Bismarck refused to consider withdrawing from the fortress even though 
the legality of the Prussian presence was in doubt. But when Russia 
proposed a European congress to settle the crises, Bismarck agreed. 
The representatives of the Powers met in Longon on May 7, 1867. 
In four days a treaty was signed guaranteeing the neutrality of 
Luxembourg and the aismantling of the Prussian fortress. 11 France had 
compelled Prussia to withdraw from Luxembourg, but at the same time 
Prussia had prevented France from entering into the Duchy. Both sides 
felt dissatisfied, and the rulers had backed down from an armed 
conflict. The French and the Germans believed that the Lux:embourg 
Treaty had merely postponed the ultimate conflict. 12 
More was at stake than possession of the Duchy. Napoleon was 
working to prevent the center of European gravity from shifting from 
Paris to Berlin. His dynasty depended on an active, successful foreign 
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policy, and he had not been too successful as of late. Bismarck, too 
was working hard, he was trying to marshal all of the forces behind the 
German national movement to support Prussia, and he realized that a 
national war against a 1::raditional enemy, France, would be just the 
h . 13 t ing. Relations between the two countries remained tense. Until 
May, 1867, and the resolution of the Luxembourg question, Napoleon had 
hoped that German unification could be accomplished without a French 
htnniliation; now he realized the futility of that hope. 
Bismarck planned to isolate France diplomatically, but France was 
not ready to accept that isolation. Austria seemed the natural counter-
poise for the new power in Germany. On August 18, 1867, Napoleon and 
Eugenie payed a visit to Franz Joseph and his queen, Elizabeth, at 
Salzburg, ostensibly to offer their condolences over the execution of 
Maximilian in Mexico. In ~eality, however, they met to discuss the 
future. During the five days of ceremony, receptions and balls, the 
two Emperors and their advisors "exchanged ideas on questions of 
14 
general interest." Although the results were minimal, Salzburg 
became the first step toward a closer understanding between the two 
Powers. Their mutual need to block Berlin, their mutual ambition for 
influence in Germany, and their mutual suspicions of each other 
pushed the~ together. 
Little came from a year spent in talks between Austrian 
Chancellor Beust and the French. Aplan for.disarmament was tried and 
rejected as unsuitatle.. Napoleon then seized upon the idea of a 
triple alliance between France, Austria and Italy. But in the 
l?i:-eliminary talks in.the spring of 1869, Austria seemed more interested 
in securing her place as. a great power than in preparing any specific 
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action, and Italy demanded the evacuation of French troops from Rome. 
The final draft on May, 1869, only laid down general principles: the 
countries agreed to follow a common policy in European affairs and 
mutually guaranteed the integrity of their territories. Should war 
symptoms appear, they would conclude an affensive and defensive 
alliance. But before the treaty was signed, Italy raised her ~emands, 
and internal disorder in France claimed the attention of the Emperor. 
Despite the noncompletion of the treaty, Napo1:eon beHeved that 
something had been accomplished. All three sovereigns considered them-
selves "morally" bound to it. As the fatal year of 1870 arrived, 
Napoleon. deluded himself into thinking that he had a firm alliance with 
A ' d I 1 · P ' . 15 ustria an ta y against russia. He felt he had insured the 
essence of his foreign policy against all eventualities. Napoleon kept 
all of these negotiations secret. 
The year 1870 brought new life to the Second Empire. A young 
liberal, Emile Ollivier, .had been asked by Napoleon to form a cabinet 
in the experiment of the Liberal Empire. The Empire became a parlia-
mentary regime, and the plebiscite of May 8, 1870, reassured the 
Emperor in his plans for France. The summer brought a feeling of calm 
and peacefulness. The tensions between France and Prussia seemingly 
had vanished. Lord Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, assured 
the Parliament that the world never had been so profoundly at peace 
h d . 1 . h 16 or t e 1p omatic atmosp ere so serene. The govermnental officials 
in the various European capitals relaxed and vacationed. 
But on July fourth, Paris was notified that Prince Leopold 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen had been offered the Spanish throne which had 
been vacant for two years. France received the news of Leopold's 
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candidature with nervous anger. The Paris journals wrote against it, 
denouncing the secrecy and regarding the project as intended to weaken 
French security. 
Gramont, the new Foreign Minister who was violently anti-Prussian, 
drafted a curt note demanding to know if the Prussian government knew 
of the event. Berlin was practically empty of responsible officials 
and the answer was that the government knew nothing, which was not 
exactly true. Bismarck had actively pushed the candidacy himself since 
February; he had sent agents to Madrid with 50,000 marks in Prussian 
bonds to facilitate the Hohenzollern candidature. 17 The Chancellor 
was concerned with building the new German state and increasing dynastic 
prestige. For these purposes he was deeply involved with it even with-
out the knowledge of William, who.was utterly against the affair. 
William said he would give his consent to the candidature only if 
Leopold agreed to it. Bis.marck pushed both Leopold and his father, 
Karl Anton, until the Prince felt it was his duty to accept. From that 
p_oint on, Bismarck declared that it was a purely family affair. That 
was not true, as from the start, Karl Anton sought the backing of the 
Prussian government. 
Bismarck had expected to present France with a!!!.!:, accompli which 
would be beyond her power to change. He looked for the diplomatic 
setback which would again shake the foundations of Napoleon's throne. 
His goal was a crises with France, desiring either to provoke a war on 
18 a French internal collapse. But a mistake in Madrid in the decoding 
of the message carrying Leopold's acceptance made it impossible to 
keep the news secret any longer, and Paris was notified of the 
candi.da ture. 
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While the Prussian government denied any knowledge of the affair, 
Gramont asked the Prussian Ambassador to Paris, Baron Karl von Wether, 
to inform William, whom he was planning to visit at Ems, of the de~p 
resentment felt by France at the news of the candidacy. Wether was 
visibly affected by Gramont and Ollivier 1 s statements and by the 
excitement of the journals. He agreed to convey his impressions to 
the King. The Ambassador's oral report intensified William's concern 
ovet a matter which he had disapproved of from the start. 
At the meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 6, presided 
over by Napoleon for the first time since the crises began, the French 
goverrunent tried to decide on its policy. Marshal LeBoeuf, speaking 
for the military, claimed that the' army was ready if war was inevitable 
and everyone believed that war was inevitable. Napoleon assured the 
Council that France had allies and showed the letters from Franz Joseph 
and Victor Enunanuel for the first time. On that afternoon Gramont 
addressed the Chamber concerning the candidature crises and closed with 
a highly colored passage: 
But we do not believe that respect for a neighboring 
people's rights compels us to suffer a foreign power, 
by putting one of its princes on the throne of 
Charles V, to.disturb the present balance of strength 
in Europe.to our disadvantage •••• We sincerely hope that 
event will not take place. Should it turn out otherwise, 
strong in your support gentlemen, and in the nation's, 
we shall know how to do our duty without wavering or 
weakness. 19 
The Assembly received this statement with a great deal of intensity 
~ 
and,emotion, but the effect was disastrous, though popular. Bismarck 
said he was ready to demand an explanation from France concerning 
Gramont 1 s speech and that he would in effect force France to choose 
between war or complete humiliation. Bismarck also began a press 
campaign against France's reaction under the guise that it was a 
Spanish national question, and the Prussian government was not in~ 
20 volved. Bismarck increased rather than lessened tensions by that 
move. 
Gramont asked for diplomatic support among the British, Italian 
and Austrian governments to bring the candidature.to an end. 21 These 
actions were directed mainly against Prussia but were designed to 
influence Madrid as well as Prussia. On July 7, Gramont ordered 
Benedetti to Ems to attempt to persuade William to command or advise 
Leopold to withdraw his candidature. The Austrian Ambassador, Prince 
Metternich, found Napoleon engrossed with the affair, and Eugenie 
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looked ten years younger at the thought of a political triumph or war. 
The military circles at court encouraged active military resistance to 
the "Prussian threat." War was demanded on all sides--from both the 
Left and Right in the Chamber, and on every Parisian street groups of 
men gathered around demanding positiye action. 
With France on the verge of mobilization and William steadfastly 
refusing to order renunciation, the diplomatic pressures focused on the 
Sigrnaringens. Karl Anton finally decided to withdraw the candidature 
of his won on July 11, 1870. The foreign diplomats considered the 
renunciation as a striking diplomatic victory for France. Napoleon was 
overjoyed that peace had been saved. But Gramont failed to recognize 
th~ extent of the victo.ry. The excited martial feelings of the people 
remained. Gramont convinced Napoleon that further guarantees were 
necessary. Without the cabinet's consent he demanded that William 
associate himself and the Prussian government with Karl Anton's 
renunciation. 
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Benedetti met with William on July 13 while he was walking in the 
gardens at Ems. After discussing the renunciation, Benedetti pressed 
upon the King the need for a promise never to let Leopold's name come 
up again. Surprised at the demand, William refused, courteously tipped 
his hat and walked off. The King refused to see the French envoy again 
but sent an aide to inform him that he had received official news of 
the withdrawal and considered the incident .closed. William then had a 
report of the meeting sent to Bismarck and enclosed a cryptic remark at 
the end of the telegram stating that Bismarck could publish the account 
if he wished. 
Bismarck meanwhile headed for Berlin from his estates. He felt 
that the withdrawal was a Prussian humiliation. In a conference with 
the Crown Prince, he gave the impression that he thought peace was 
assured despite the Russian Count Gortschakoff 1s intimations of further 
·French demands. 22 
Von Roon and Moltke were dining with Bismarck when William's 
telegram arrived that evening. Bismarck immediately saw the possi-
bilities it contained. He rapidly drew up a revised draft which was 
much shorter and much ruder; it appeared that William had been .in_sulted 
by the French envoy and had dismissed him. As Bismarck later claimed 
to have remarked to the others: 
If ••• I at once communicated this text ••• it will be 
known in Paris before midnight, and not only on account 
of its content, but also on account of the manner of its 
distribution~ will have the effect of a red rag upon the 
Gallic bull. 3 
He distributed it in Berlin and telegraphed it to the German states .and 
most of the European capitals except Paris. 
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Paris heard the news soon enough. Napoleon and his ministers 
realized that Bismarck was intent on forcing a war on France. The 
excited crowds yelling ''! ~ ~ frusse! 11 11! Berlin! 11 in the streets, 
the impatient deputies in the Chamber, the agitation of the war party 
at Court applied pressures on the regime that it could not withstand. 
The Parisian journals demanded war and correctly echoed the sentiments 
of the nation; Ollivier lost control of policy in the face of a public 
d d . 24 eman ing war. 
The French cabinet met at the Tuileries on July 14 and ordered 
mobilization. Op July 15 Gramont and Ollivier presented to the Chamber 
their request for money to cover the mobilization costs. These requests 
amounted to a declaration of war. The fonnal declaration of war 
reached Berlin four days later on July 19, 1870. 
France went to war with a sick Emperor, over-confident generals, 
no allies, an unprepared anny, and a great deal of enthusiasm. Prussia 
went to war with competent generals, an excellent anny, the jubilant 
Bismarck and a great deal of enthusiasm. As a result of the war, 
Napoleon III lost his Empire, and William gained his. 
France was eager for a showdown with Prussia to regain the prestige 
she lost after Sadowa. Empress Eugenie and the Court party, ''.Gramont 
at the foreign office, the war ministry, Bonapartist leaders in both 
houses of parliament, together with a powerful segment of the press, all 
b.elieved that only the total humi1iation of Prussia--by diplomacy or by 
war--could save the weak regime. The pain-racked Emperor was torn 
between the Bonapartist desire for a military triumph that would 
magically solve all of his problems at one blow, and the hope for 
peace. But he was tired, sick and irresolute. He allowed himself to be 
70 
swayed by the cockiness of the people around him, losing the very thing 
he had dedicated his entire life to achieving--the restoration of a 
Bonaparte to the throne of France. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF NAPOLEON III AND THE 
NAPOLEONIC LEGEND 
Napoleon Bonaparte spent the greater part of his life controlling 
the destinies of the people around him. When he was sent to St. Helena 
after his final deneat in 1815, he could no longer rule the people 
directly. As a result, he created the Napoleonic Legend to rule them 
indirectly through his memory. In formulating the Legend he refashioned 
his life to exalt his accomplishments and minimize his faults. Napoleon 
portrayed himself as a man of the people, savior of the Revolution and 
lover of peace. He claimed to have sought to reorganize Europe 
according to the principle of nationality and to have wanted to 
establish a European federation of states. 
His goal in the development of the Legend was to create a situa-
tion which would make it possib'le for his heir, another Bonaparte, to 
return to the throne of France and the leadership of Europe. This aim 
was accomplished when his nephew, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, became 
President of the Second Republic in 1848 and later Emperor of the French· 
in 1'852. 
Louis Napoleon had been captivated by the Legend early in his life. 
He found the Napoleonic career worthy of emulation, and his uncle's 
b policy had been worthy of success, for he was a great man, and 11a great 
1 man can be directed only by great conceptions." Louis was convinced 
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that his uncle's programs were good for France and for Europe. He 
decided that he had to avoid the mistakes of the first Napoleon but 
follow the essential Napoleonic principles. 
The guidance provided by this program served as his "star" for, 
like Napoleon I, Louis believed in his destiny to accomplish great 
things. As Queen Victoria reflected after the visit of the Imperial 
Couple to London in 185!1: "He is evidently possessed of.~.a great 
reliance on what he calls his Star. He has invariably been guided by -
the belief that he is fulfilling~ destiny which God has imposed upon 
h . 112 im •.•• He realized, however, that he had to adapt the Napoleonic 
principles to his new age, but wanted to use his power to resume the 
work of Napoleon I. He planned that the Second Empire would pick up 
where the First had left off. He used the ideas of the Napoleonic 
Legend as the foundation of his foreign policy. 
Louis Napoleon also claimed to be a man of the people. As 
guardian of the Revolution he reinstated universal manhood suffrage to 
gauge the wants and needs of the people through plebiscites. His main 
backers were th~ peasantry, who felt the appeal of his call for order 
and glory. To satisfy France's need for glory he knew that he had to 
embark upon an active and successful foreign policy to re-establish 
France's hegemony on the Continent and break the Diktat of Vienna. 
Once in power, Napoleon III used the principles of the Napoleonic 
Legend as the goals of his foreign policy. Foremost of these was the 
desire to re-establish French power on the Continent and break the 
treaties of 1815, which had forbidden a Bonaparte to remount the French 
throne, reduced the French borders, isolated her diplomatically, and 
humiliated that proud nation. He wanted to avenge his uncle by 
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weakening the two countries he blaimed for Napoleon's fall, Russia and 
Austria. As a man of th~ nineteenth century and an advocate of the 
Legend, Louis Napoleon embraced the principle of nationality and hoped 
to reorganize Europe to satisfy the national desires.-of Italy and 
Germany to France's satisfaction. Believing in his uncle's wish to 
form a federation of European states, he looked for opportunities to 
call for conferences to deal with common problems in preparation for the 
federative ideal. Napoleon sought to obtain for France her "natural 
boundaries" and to give France the glory and triumph she deserved as 
the first nation in Europe. 
From the time he came to power, 1848, to the year he lost his 
Empire, 1870, Napoleon Ill sought to reconcile the contradictory goals 
of his policy: he was a Bonaparte who embraced the army and military 
• 
tradition but claimed that 11L1Empire c 1est paix, 11 an arcent French 
patriot who would subordinate national interests to help create united 
nations on the northern and eastern borders, and a man who followed 
traditional foreign policy at the same ti~e he worked for the new prin-
ciples of nationality and European-wide cooperation. It was because of 
these contradictions that Napoleon III had diff~culty in reconciling 
his aims and eventually lost his throne. 
These conflicts of interests did not seem to overly bother 
Napoleon, for he was more European in his thinking than French. As 
F, A. Simpson aptly describes the Emperors 
No ruler of France--none perhaps of any European 
country--was so cosmopolitan in his training and outlook 
as Napoleon III. None certainly was less French,, 
Essentially he was an international figure: too good a 
citizen perhaps of Europe to be the ultimately success-
ful ruler of any one country in it. The dreams and 
broodings of South Germany, the sleepy dignity of the 
Dutch, the slow speech and kindliness of England, the 
secretiveness and fatalism of the Italy he so loved--
these were his, and a compassion for the people and a 3 
humanitarian idealism that were not peculiarly French. 
He did achieve much in following the Napoleonic Legend, but it 
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also contributed to his downfall. In the Crimean War he re-established 
French hegemony in Europe. He secured his own place on the throne, 
overturning the section of the settlement of 1815 which fotbade the 
return of a Bonaparte as ruler of France. He allied France with the 
major enemy of Napoleon I, England, and humiliated the victor of 1812 
and the champion of the Holy Alliance, Russia. Napoleon rejuvenated 
France with fresh military victories and glory. As the arbiter of 
Europe, he convened a European congress to settle the corranon problems 
of the day, including the question so dear to his heart, Italian 
nationality. 
His next major diplomatic accomplislunent was again guided by the 
dictates of the Legend, the liberation of Italy from the Austrian yoke. 
In fighting for Italian liberty, he fur;her damaged the hated settlement 
of 1815 by humiliating and weakening the power of.Austria. More 
importantly, to his mind, he had furthered the cause of nationalities 
in the peninsula. The acquisition of Nice and Savoy was mainly to 
satisfy French opinion, but this also completed France's drive for her 
"natural boundaries" to the Alps. But his Italian adventure also 
brought problems that he never successfully resolved. He had intended 
to liberate Italy, not to unite her, but his military successes 
started the unification process which had joined all of Italy, except 
Venetia and Rome, by 1861. Instead of furthering French influence in 
Italy, he had helped create a united nation on her southeastern flank, 
which was totally against the traditional interests .of France. He 
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also alienated an important source of his support in France, the 
Catholics, by threatening the temporal power of the Pope. 
From 1860 on, his interpretation of the Napoleonic Legend caused 
him more harm than good. Napoleon h~d alienated the Italians by 
retaining the French troops in Rome; he lost the support of the Russian 
Tsar by support~ng the Polish uprising in 1863; he wasted men and 
resources in the chimerical attempt to establish the Austrian Maximilian 
in Mexico. By the time his greatest trial approaches in the form of 
Bismarckian Prussia, the Emp~ror was a physically tired and sick man wHo 
clung irresolutely to the contradictory policies of French hegemony and 
the principle of nationality. Growing internal opposition coupled 
with his mistakes in foreign policy made it imperative that he retain 
complete control of the situation at precisely the time that it was 
impossible for nim to do so. He was not able to withstand the 
• 
resolute determination of Otto von Bismarck, the fickle public opinion 
of France to which he had to cater, the ineptitude of the peopel around 
him, and his own conflicting desires. In the end his world collapsed 
when he surrendered the French forces at Sedan on September 2, 1870. 
When Louis Napoleon lost his Empire, he lost his reason for being~ 
He, like Napoleon I, had fo'tlowed h!l.s star to the end of his destiny, 
and died in exile three years later. He had followed the Napoleonic 
Legend as far as anything which was basically a lie could take him. 
Napoleon III had accomplished much for France; he restored her place as 
the first nation in Europe; he re-established her glory and her fame. 
But in the end the innate contradictions within the Legen9 itself 
surfaced to contribute to the fall of the Second Empire. 
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